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Due to the operational complexities of drilling, completion and well intervention 
activities, it is often quite challenging to predict a potential blowout scenario timely and 
efficiently. In drilling operations, blowouts are usually preceded by kicks and predicting 
kicks early is crucial for regaining control of the well and preventing major incident. Kicks 
and blowouts happen due to failure of well control barriers and leading indicators could 
be very effective in identify vulnerabilities in such systems. For assessing integrity of well 
control barriers with appropriate sets of leading indicators, a robust framework was 
proposed and sets of probabilistic models were developed in this work. By following a 
systematic cause-based methodology proposed in this work, sets of leading indicators 
were identified for monitoring barrier performances while drilling, completion and well 
intervention activities. Analyses of Montara and Deepwater Horizon blowout incidents 
demonstrated applicability of leading indicators framework in revealing system 
weaknesses prior to major incidents. Using the real-time kick indicators, decision support 
algorithms were developed in this work which would help to understand a kick 
progression scenario and actions required to confirm a kick. Leading indicators-based 
probabilistic models were developed for evaluating the relative importance of different 
organizational and operational factors, and assessing their impacts on the key causal 
factors of well control barrier failure events. These models were constructed for 
hydrostatic head failure events which can be caused by abnormal pore pressure and 




model for assessing well control failure events during wireline operations was also 
constructed. These models represent realistic scenario of barrier health and could be very 
useful for determining barrier failure probabilities from observed data. Addition to these, 
efficiencies of kick detection parameters to detect potential influxes and factors impacting 
their performances can also be assessed with the developed models. These functions 
enable informed decision-making for preventing kicks and blowouts while drilling or 
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Blowouts are considered to be the most notorious events in oil and gas industry 
which have caused hundreds of fatalities and injuries, millions of barrels of oil release to 
the environment and billions of dollars of property damage over the last few decades. As 
per US Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) and US Bureau of 
Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) statistics, from 1980-2011 a total of 77 blowouts 
and 32 major well release events were reported from 31,574 drilled wells in US Gulf of 
Mexico (BOEM, 2014). The picture is almost similar in other parts of the world. Many 
catastrophic events resulted from uncontrolled well releases while drilling or other well 
operations. For instance, in recent times, the Deepwater Horizon blowout in the US Gulf 
of Mexico caused 11 fatalities (Marsh, 2014) and about 4.9 million barrels (U.S. Coast 
Guard, 2011) of oil spill in 2010 and the Montara blowout in Western Australia caused 
about 30,000 barrels (Koh, 2012) of crude oil spill in 2009. But incidents like Deepwater 
Horizon and Montara do not just happen due to a single failure, rather they usually result 
from a complex combination of deficiencies that coincide – technical or operational 
failure, inadequate safeguards or safety management systems, and human factors. Focus 
                                                 
* Tamim, N., Laboureur, D. M., Mentzer, R. A., Hasan, A. R., & Mannan, M. S. (2017). A framework for 
developing leading indicators for offshore drillwell blowout incidents. Process Safety and Environmental 
Protection, 106, 256-262. Copyright 2017 Institution of Chemical Engineers. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Part of this section and figures are reprinted with permission from Elsevier Ltd. 
 
* Tamim, N., Liu, R., Mannan, M.S. and Hasan, A.R. (2017). Understanding the physics of blowouts and 
their prevention approaches. Journal of Environmental Solutions for Oil, Gas, and Mining, 3(1), pp.1-18. 
Part of this section (Section 1.1.2) and figures are reprinted with permission from College Publishing. 
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on these factors can reveal any existing inconsistencies in the system that may initiate a 
blowout event.  
This work is dedicated to studying the scope and methodology of developing 
leading indicators-based framework primarily for offshore drilling and well operations 
focusing on kicks and blowout incidents. Flow of uncontrolled well fluids into a wellbore 
and to the environment is called a blowout. As blowouts are low frequency-high 
consequence events, lagging indicators cannot offer a good measure because having a low 
past incident rate or low rate of gas kick events does not eliminate or help predict the 
chances of a future uncontrolled gas kick resulting in a blowout. Again, drilling is a 
complex multi-stakeholder process and organizational factors play a crucial role in risk 
management and acceptance which can only be taken into consideration with appropriate 
sets of leading indicators. Thus, it is utmost necessary to have comprehensive sets of 
leading indicators to constantly monitor the performances of well control systems while 
drilling or other well operations from both operational and organizational perspectives.  
 
1.1. Thesis Organization 
 
To understand kicks and blowout phenomenon and their prevention approaches, a 
comprehensive literature review was conducted which has been presented in Section 2. 
Current practices for developing and using leading indicators have also been analyzed and 
discussed in the same section. Based on the review presented in Section 2, a research 
roadmap was developed for solving the existing challenges of developing a robust 
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program for predicting kicks and preventing blowouts by monitoring and managing well 
control barriers effectively. In Section 4, a working definition of leading indicators has 
been proposed with detailed categorization. Inspired from the aviation practices, a step-
by-step cause-based approach was proposed and applied to identify potential sets of 
leading indicators for well control barrier elements. A comprehensive study of past 
blowout incidents has also been conducted to assess the applicability and usefulness of the 
proposed framework and the results have been included in Section 4. In the following 
section, leading indicators are further analyzed for their critical use in decision making 
and risk assessment purposes. With the real-time leading indicators, a couple of decision 
support algorithms were developed to demonstrate kick progression scenarios effectively. 
Major contributing causal factors for barrier failures and kick initiating events were 
identified by conducting fault-tree analysis for barrier failure events. Several Bayesian 
network models were developed correlating different categories of leading indicators for 
different well operations which have been presented and discussed in Section 5. Due to 
scarcity of leading indicators data, probability distributions for leading indicators were 
assumed based on incident findings and expert judgement. Section 6 contains a brief 





1.2. Major Contributions 
 
Major contributions of this research work include but not limited to – 
1. Developed a robust framework with clear definitions and categorization of 
leading indicators, that can be applied to any well operations including drilling, 
completion and well intervention.  
2. Proposed a step-by-step caused-based methodology for identifying appropriate 
sets of leading indicators for monitoring health and performances of well 
control barrier system and identifying system weaknesses that need to be 
improved for preventing major well control events. 
3. Identified comprehensive sets of leading indicators for drilling, completion and 
wireline operations that can be adopted by the industry. For drilling operations, 
primary focus was made on kick prediction and prevention, rather than blowout 
prevention. So, the program could identify problems in the system early 
enough when the risk is comparatively low and upsets are manageable.  
4. Constructed probabilistic models to assess possibilities of encountering well 
control barrier failure events for drilling and completion activities, by 
integrating leading indicators information with real-time process observables. 
One of the major advantages of these models over the traditional risk 
assessment models is, the developed leading indicators-based probabilistic 
models can represent health and status of the well control programs/systems 
by using data obtained from the same system. Since this analysis is system-
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specific, it can provide more realistic information on well control barrier failure 
probabilities.  
5. One inherent advantage of Bayesian Network is its ability to perform both 
predictive and diagnostic analysis, which can be effectively utilized with the 
proposed models for designing effective well control program and constantly 
monitoring its performance.   
 
1.3. Introduction to Well Operations and Well Control 
 
1.3.1. Well Drilling and Completion 
 
Wells are drilled for discovering petroleum reservoirs and producing oil and gas. 
When the purpose is to explore or discover potential reservoir, the drilling is called 
wildcat/exploration drilling. These are the first wells drilled with information from seismic 
surveys and nearby reservoirs (if available). If the result of wildcat drilling is promising, 
then appraisal wells can be drilled to obtain more information on the reservoir and its 
productivity. If considered economically viable, development wells are drilled for 
producing oil and gas from the reservoir/s. Seismic surveys and geologic studies are 
conducted prior to any drilling operations in order to obtain information on potential 
reservoirs and to determine the best possible location for drilling. 
Drilling fluids or muds are integral part of well drilling process. They are added 
and circulated through the wellbore to facilitate drilling operations. While drilling a well, 
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a constant flow of drilling fluid is maintained which has multiple critical functions 
including cuttings transport, cooling, support drillstring/casing weight and most 
importantly control subsurface pressure to prevent influxes from the reservoir. Based on 
mud component/phases drilling fluids can be divided into three major groups – water-
based (WB) fluids, oil-based (OB) fluids and pneumatic fluids.  
Based on the location of the reservoirs, wells can be drilled vertically or 
directionally. Drilling processes can further be categorized based on drilling pressure 
margin or applied bottom-hole/wellbore pressure –  
1. Conventional: Overbalanced drilling 
2. Unconventional: Managed pressure drilling (MPD), Underbalanced 
drilling (UBD) 
Difference between conventional/overbalanced and unconventional/managed 
pressure drilling can be describe with the pressure profile presented in Figure 1. In 
conventional drilling, the wellbore/bottom-hole pressure are always kept significantly 
above the formation/pore pressure to reduce the possibilities of an influx. On the other 
hand, in unconventional drilling, the wellbore pressure is precisely controlled with a set 
of equipment and is kept very close to the formation pressure or sometimes even below 
the formation pressure. This helps to improve drilling efficiency, reduce cost and minimize 
probabilities of damaging the reservoir. Managed pressure drilling (MPD) is an example 
of unconventional drilling which is defined as “an adaptive drilling method used to 
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precisely control the annular pressure throughout a wellbore”1. Applied backpressure or 
Constant Bottomhole Pressure (CBHP) MPD is one of the most common types of MPD 
system. In general, MPD system consists of Rotating Control Device (RCD) to provide a 
seal between the pipe and the annulus and a backpressure choke to pressurize the annular 




Figure 1 Pressure profile for overbalanced and managed pressure drilling 
 
                                                 




Well completion is the stage between well drilling and production operations. The 
purpose of well completion is to prepare a drilled well for production or injection. Typical 
steps of well completions include casing, cementing, perforating, gravel packing and 
installation of sub-surface valves and production trees. Completions can be divided into 
two groups – reservoir completion and upper completion. In reservoir completion, a 
connection is made with the reservoir and the well. And in upper completion the reservoir 
and well are connected to the surface facility.  
 
1.3.2. Well Intervention/Workover 
 
Well intervention or workover activities can be defined as well maintenance or 
surveillance operations that are performed on existing producing wells. The objectives 
include well stimulation to increase production, repair/modify downhole equipment, 
cleaning or collecting downhole information. Wireline/slickline, coiled tubing, hydraulic 
workover, snubbing are some examples of well intervention operations. A major 
difference between well drilling and intervention/workover is - in workover operations a 
pressurized producing zone is always present, where in drilling this zone is exposed for a 
short period of time. For this reason, well control planning is quite different in well 
workover operations when compared to drilling. This is discussed in detail in the next 
section. Well intervention operations require specific set of equipment and tools. Usually, 
a set of equipment are assembled and mounted on the top of the wellhead valve tree for 
intervening a well. For example, some major equipment that are used to facilitate wireline 
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operations include stuffing box, lubricator, wireline, winch, grease injection system, 
hydraulic control pump and quick union.  
 
1.3.3. Kicks and Blowouts 
 
Flow of uncontrolled formation fluids (oil, gas, water or mixture) from a well is 
called a blowout. Kicks are precursors to blowout and flow of fluids from reservoirs to 
wellbore in presence of drilling fluid is called a kick. While drilling through a porous and 
permeable formations, if wellbore pressure drops below the pore pressure a kick or influx 
can happen (Figure 2).  
Gas kicks behave differently in different types of drilling fluids based on their 
solubility. Solubility of hydrocarbon gases are very small in water-based drilling fluids 
compared to the oil-based drilling fluids. That makes a big difference in kick detection 
and well control planning. For oil-based drilling muds, if gas enters the wellbore, it mostly 
remains dissolved in drilling fluids due to high pressure. But with drilling fluid travelling 
upwards at a lower pressure zone, gas gradually starts to come out of the solution and 
starts expanding. This is a major challenge for early detection of gas kicks and thus it is 
very important to pick any weak signals or differential parameters to allow maximum time 








1.3.4. Well Control Barriers 
 
To prevent uncontrolled influx of hydrocarbons, different ‘barriers’ are designed 
and used during different well activities (e.g., drilling, tripping out, running casing, 
completion, workover). Barriers can be primarily divided into two categories – 
engineering/operational and organizational. For drilling or other well activities, different 





Figure 3 Well control barriers 
Reprinted with permission from College Publishing. Copyright 2017. 
 
Organizational elements are the governing factors for engineering controls that are 
implemented to prevent blowouts. Key organizational factors include hazard analysis, risk 
assessment, barrier management systems, effective drilling practices and procedures, well 
control responses, training and competency, experience, effective management-of-change 
policies and procedures, robust audit and inspection programs. Well-designed risk 
indicators/safety metrics program can provide valuable information on overall 
organizational safety performances – which is one of objectives of this research study. 
Different regulations, standards and literatures categorize and characterize barrier 
elements differently. As per the NORSOK standard (2004), well control barrier system 
includes primary and secondary well barriers, well barrier elements and/or common well 
barrier elements. The primary and secondary well barriers should be independent and 
available during all well activities and operations to ensure that no single failure of well 
barriers could lead to the uncontrolled wellbore fluid flow event. For conventional drilling, 
the primary barrier usually refers to the hydrostatic pressure provided by the drilling mud, 
and the secondary barrier could include a variety of equipment, such as the BOP, wellhead, 
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casing, tubing, and drilling string safety valve. Barriers can also be categorized as dynamic 
barriers for drilling phase and static barriers for production phase (Holland, 1997). But 
regardless of different terminologies, it is established that during different well activities, 
at least two independent and tested well control barriers must be in place. NORSOK 
Standard (2004) requires two independent well barriers to be present during all well 
activities and operations. BSEE Well Control Rule (2015) also states the requirement of 
two independent and tested well control barriers prior to any well activities including BOP 
removal, negative pressure test, well interruption and others. In general, these two well 
barriers are termed as primary and secondary well control barriers. The drilling mud or 
hydrostatic head while drilling and the barrier closest to the reservoir (i.e., Surface 
Controlled Sub-Surface Safety Valve (SCSSV)) for producing well are usually considered 
as primary well control barriers. BOP shear ram while drilling or servicing and any 
mechanical valve above SCSSV can serve as secondary well control barriers. Again, 
barrier elements can differ based on drilling technologies as well. For instance, in MPD, 
hydrostatic head may not always be greater that the formation pressure due to narrow mud 
pressure window and MPD pressure control equipment (PCE) serves as a barrier under 
those situations. 
Failure in primary well control barrier may cause oil and gas influx into wellbore 
and kicks. The next step in blowout prevention is kick detection and kick killing 
operations, failures in that would require secondary barrier to be activated.  Blowout may 
result if secondary barrier fails to cut the influx and seal the wellbore. Organizational 
factors govern the efficiency of each of the elements to prevent blowout. Potential primary 
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and secondary well control barriers for different well activities have been briefly 
summarized in Table 1.  
 
Table 1 Well control barriers for different phases of drilling and well activities 
 





























































































































In majority of the drilling operations hydrostatic head is considered to be the 
primary well control barrier and failure of this causes kicks. Thus, it is very crucial to 
monitor integrity of this barrier as from here most of the well control issues start and many 
of them can lead to blowouts. This study focuses primarily on kick prediction and 
prevention so majority of the analysis is planned to be conducted for monitoring the 
integrity of primary well control barriers. 
 
1.4. Introduction to Leading and Lagging Indicators 
 
Different organization use process safety metrics or risk indicators to evaluate and 
benchmark their day to day safety performances. Historically, companies have been using 
lagging indicators, i.e., the total recordable incident rate (TRIR), lost time incident rate 
(LTIR), number of fatalities or injuries in general, to monitor and track organizational 
safety performances. But these are mostly personal safety measures and provide very little 
or no picture at all on overall process safety performances. So, industry started to consider 
leading indicators which are proactive or predictive measures and offer a closer look into 
the operational and organizational safety culture. Necessity of having a workable set of 
process safety indicators came into discussion particularly after the Texas City refinery 
explosion in 2005 where the Baker panel report (Baker et al., 2007) recommended to 
establish leading and lagging process safety indicators to help prevent such incidents. 
Offshore drilling and well activities (e.g., workover, wireline jobs etc.), being very 
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complex and high-risk operations, can similarly be benefitted from implementation of 
well-specified leading indicators for early prediction of potential upsets. 
A well control event can be represented with the leading to lagging transitional 
arrow diagram presented in Figure 4. Originally, Wang et al. (2013) proposed a similar 
leading-lagging synthesis scale for general process industry, which was modified for 
describing drilling operations in this work.  
 
 
Figure 4 Transition from lagging to leading indicators in drilling 
Reprinted with permission from Elsevier Ltd. Copyright 2017. 
 
For blowout incidents, fatalities/injuries/environmental releases are considered to 
be the most lagging events. On the other hand; training, barrier management, well design 
and overall organizational safety culture are amongst the most leading events. Events like 
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kicks, failure of a primary barrier, or near-misses lie in a transition zone and they can be 
considered either as leading or lagging indicators based on the context.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW** 
 
2.1. Well Control 
 
As discussed in Section 1, well control is a process or system to keep flow of 
pressurized hydrocarbons within a safety envelope and operational control.  Well control 
program is different for different phases of drilling and well operations. Hydrostatic head 
applied by the circulating drilling fluids, cementing and blowout preventer (BOP) are 
considered to be the major well control barriers to prevent unwanted hydrocarbon influxes. 
Early kick detection is also very critical for allowing maximum possible time to regain 
control of a flowing well and minimizing chances of major well control events. Many 
works have been done to improve barrier performances and kick detection capabilities 
which have been briefly discussed in this section.  
 
  
                                                 
* Tamim, N., Laboureur, D. M., Mentzer, R. A., Hasan, A. R., & Mannan, M. S. (2017). A framework for 
developing leading indicators for offshore drillwell blowout incidents. Process Safety and Environmental 
Protection, 106, 256-262. Copyright 2017 Institution of Chemical Engineers. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Part of this section is reprinted with permission from Elsevier Ltd. 
 
* Tamim, N., Liu, R., Mannan, M.S. and Hasan, A.R. (2017). Understanding the physics of blowouts and 
their prevention approaches. Journal of Environmental Solutions for Oil, Gas, and Mining, 3(1), pp.1-18. 
Part of this section (Section 1.1.2) is reprinted with permission from College Publishing. 
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2.1.1. Well Control Barriers 
 
In conventional drilling, drilling fluid (mud) is considered as the primary well 
control barrier. The mud program is designed to maintain a hydrostatic head greater than 
the formation/pore pressure to prevent influxes but lower than the formation fracture 
pressure. Besides maintaining appropriate hydrostatic head, the functions of drilling fluid 
also include cutting transportation, cooling and lubricating the drill bit, maintaining 
wellbore stability, and fluid loss control. Therefore, designing a proper and efficient 
drilling fluid with safe density margin is very critical for drilling performances and well 
control activities. For underbalanced or managed pressure drilling, a combination of 
pressure and flow control equipment work together with drilling mud as primary well 
control barrier. For underbalanced condition the pressure control assembly comprises of 
sealing mechanism around drill pipe, choke manifold and non-return valves.  
Cements can also serve as primary barrier in many circumstances (e.g., well 
completion, testing, servicing, production phase). Cementing failure can cause severe well 
integrity issues and cements can fail due to several reasons which were identified and 
studied in various literature – formation damage/caving, casing centralization issue, 
inadequate placement, inadequate bonding or de-bonding of cements with casing and 
rocks, shrinkage, contamination, and mechanical/thermal stress (Teodoriu, et al., 2013). 
Many studies have been performed to evaluate cement integrity in high pressure high 
temperature (HPHT) conditions using advanced imaging technologies, stress/strain 
analysis, and ultrasonic measurements. Still researchers are analyzing different aspects of 
 
19 
cementing including development of new materials or additives, accurate placement 
techniques, bonding and sealing mechanisms, smart evaluation, and testing 
methodologies. 
Blowout preventer (BOP) is considered to be the most crucial and critical 
secondary well control barrier. BOP consists of two major types of preventers – annular 
preventers and ram-type preventers. Annular preventers generally seal around objects, 
such as drill pipe, casing or well servicing tools; whereas ram-type preventers offer more 
diverse application. Pipe rams are designed to seal around a pipe, blind rams are used to 
seal an open hole and shear rams have cutting edges which can cut through the drill pipe 
and isolate the wellbore completely. Control module, choke manifold, choke lines, and 
accumulators are some other significant elements of blowout preventer system. BOP 
reliability is a major issue which drives the advancements in BOP control, operation and 
testing technologies. After the Deepwater Horizon blowout, many researchers have 
conducted work in the space of BOP performance and safety upgrades. Baugh et al. (2011) 
discussed some key BOP safety upgrades which are depth compensated accumulators, 
shearable drill collars, improved Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) dynamic positioning, 
constant tension reels and so forth.  However comprehensive studies are required in many 
critical areas which include drill pipe shearing capacity, well compatibility, ROV 
capabilities, reliable equipment monitoring and piston positioning system, and smart 





2.1.2. Causes of Kicks 
 
There are many factors which can cause bottomhole pressure to drop below the 
formation pressure and flow of formation fluids into the wellbore. Some of the major 
causes of kicks include – 
 
▪ Abnormal pore pressure 
Drilling into an unanticipated abnormally pore pressure zone can lead to a kick. 
Abnormal pore pressure can be caused by different geographical issues 
including faulting and uplifting, salt formations, anticlinal structures or trapped 
pressures. 
 
▪ Insufficient drilling fluid density 
This can cause reduction in hydrostatic head applied by the fluid column and 
well to go underbalance. Fluid density can be reduced intentionally 
(underbalanced drilling, fluid change), unintentionally (excessive dilution, 
heavy rains in the pits, temperature expansion) or due to operational error 
(miscalculation). 
 
▪ Failure to keep hole full 
While tripping out of a hole, drilling fluid needs to be added to replace the drill 
pipes to prevent reduction in hydrostatic head. In case of failure to replace the 
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displaced drill pipes, bottomhole pressure can drop below the formation 
pressure leading to a kick. 
 
▪ Swabbing 
Swabbing refers to a piston effect in wellbore which can happen while tripping 
drill pipes out of the hole. If the drill pipe assembly is pulled too fast out of the 
hole and drilling fluids fail to fill it effectively, a void can be created downhole 
causing an influx from the reservoir.  
 
▪ Lost circulation 
If hydrostatic pressure applied by the drilling fluid circulation exceeds the 
fracture pressure of an exposed formation while drilling, lost circulation can 
occur leading to a decrease in height of the fluid column. Failure to compensate 
the loss can result in kick. 
 
▪ Cement failure 
Kicks can happen due to cement failure as well. Annular flow after primary 
cement job is a phenomenon which can happen due to improper 
placement/settling of cements. Cementing can fail and gas can migrate for 
different reasons, e.g., cement contamination, shrinkage, inadequate 




2.1.3. Kick Detection 
 
Kick detection is undoubtedly one of the most critical factors in blowout 
prevention. Typically, blowouts are preceded by kicks, so early kick detection allows more 
time to ‘kill’ a kick before it runs out of control. Traditionally, differential flow rate, pit 
volume, wellbore annulus pressure, mud pump stroke variation, drilling break, and mud 
properties have been used as some of the accepted kick indicators. But these parameters 
need an influx to trigger action and there could be false alarms as well. Based on the data 
accuracy and interpretation, and drillers’ experience, the volume and position of kick can 
vary which largely impact the kick response and mitigation process. There are many 
challenges of using these conventional techniques for detecting kicks, for example – 
▪ Inaccuracy or delay in kick detection due to gas solubility, fluid 
compressibility, wellbore elasticity or breathing, variable thermal 
conditions (BSEE, 2015) 
▪ For offshore operations, vessel movement and wave motion can introduce 
additional difficulties 
As per various investigation report, the Deepwater Horizon blowout incident 
demonstrated the shortcomings of conventional kick detection system as the kick, which 
eventually escalated to a blowout, went unnoticed for a certain period of time. 
Unfortunately kick detection technology has not made much progress compared to drilling 
technology, which constitutes a major well control threat.  Many works are being done to 
develop advanced kick detection methodologies and researchers are continuously seeking 
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for robust kick detection systems for different drilling processes. For example, one of the 
recent works suggested that, accuracy of the conventional kick detection methodology can 
be significantly improved by adding high accuracy mass flow meter, e.g., Coriolis flow 
meter, in the outflow line (Fraser et al., 2014). Mass flow measurements instead of 
volumetric flow can provide better calculation of pit gain. Johnson et al. (2014) discussed 
different aspects of kick detection and analyzed the use of conventional pit volume 
totalizer (PVT) system incorporating with advanced instrumentation to detect influx in 
managed pressure or deepwater drilling. In deepwater drilling risers can provide a very 
efficient platform to install pressure and temperature transmitting instruments.  
Measurement while drilling (MWD) and Logging while drilling (LWD) systems 
are considered to be very useful tools for facing the challenges of early kick detection in 
unconventional wells and many researchers have developed methodologies using 
MWD/LWD techniques. National Energy Technology Laboratory proposed a technique 
of using MWD/LWD data signals with a series of filters and algorithms to monitor real-
time borehole conditions (Tost et al., 2016). MWD/LWD systems are consist of downhole 
electro-mechanical measurement tools which collect various bottomhole data (e.g., 
pressure, temperature, flow, torque). These data can be transmitted to the surface facilities 
using various techniques, e.g., acoustics, telemetry, ultrasonic sensors or wired drill pipe. 
Mud pulse telemetry is the most common data transmission tool but it has certain 
limitations including low data transmission rates, time lag and it requires a minimum fluid 
flow rate (BSEE, 2015). Use of intelligent/wired drill pipe is considered to be a potential 
solution to this problem, as it can transmit a large amount of data quickly to the surface 
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facility while drilling. This technology has successfully been deployed in many rigs and 
it is believed that by using this technology the kick detection time can be reduced to less 
than half (Vajargah et al., 2013).  
Use of managed pressure drilling (MPD) technique can significantly improve 
accuracy of kick detection and efficiency of kick control. Managed pressure drilling is a 
closed-loop, pressurized process which offers great benefits of detecting small influxes in 
the system. By using advanced equipment and flow measurements, kicks can be detected 
very early and circulated out by increasing backpressure and/or adjusting pump flow rate 
[Vajargah et al., 2015]. Field performances has also suggested MPD to be capable of 
eliminating wellbore ballooning and breathing (Fraser et al., 2014). One of the biggest 
advantages of using MPD technique is its ability to detect small influxes in oil-based 
drilling fluids (Santos et al., 2007), which is a big challenge for conventional drilling 
process. But deployment of MPD techniques can be expensive and many of the existing 
rigs and drilling systems are not capable of accommodating MPD technology.  
Another big challenge in kick detection is detecting kicks while making 
connections. Mud pumps are turned off during adding a drill pipe and bottomhole pressure 
in the wellbore is decreased due to loss of the frictional part of the total equivalent 
circulating density (ECD) of drilling mud. This may cause well to kick, but the transient 
nature of connection related back-flow from the well can complicate kick detection 
process. To overcome this challenge machine learning tools was used to develop 
fingerprints of expected flow behavior for providing information on abnormal situations 
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or kicks (Tarr et al., 2016). Kick detection while pulling out of hole is another challenging 
task and these are heavily reliant on driller’s experience and situational judgment.  
Researchers have applied some other novel technologies to improve kick detection 
timing and efficiency. Bang et al. (1994) developed an acoustic gas kick detection system 
with wellhead sonar which is independent of mud circulation. They reported successful 
kick detection with an experiment in water and water-based drilling fluid. Later, Taherian 
et al. (2013) also proposed a kick detection method using an acoustic transducer. Another 
interesting method was proposed by DiFoggio et al. (2014) who used reflectors on the 
outside of bottomhole assembly to detect influx using a transducer assembly. Doria et al. 
(1997) studied the challenges of kick detection in floating drilling rig due to heavy motion 
and proposed a new approach for accurate mud flow measurement to detect influx.   
Despite all these efforts and development, implementation of many of these 
technologies have still remained a big challenge due to many factors including cost, lack 
of adaptability, capabilities of drilling system and induced complexities.  
 
2.1.4. Kick Control 
 
Once a kick is detected and confirmed it is essential to shut-in the well promptly. 
Shut-in procedure depends on the operation being performed while taking the kick, e.g., 
drilling, tripping, running a casing. There are two common procedure for shutting a well 
after receiving a kick while drilling – ‘hard’ shut-in and ‘soft’ shut-in. In the hard shut-in, 
the annular preventers of blowout preventer (BOP) stack are closed immediately after the 
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mud pumps are shut down. On the other hand, in soft shut-in, the choke is operated before 
closing the annular preventers. For shallow kicks, instead of complete shut-in diverter 
system can be used to divert the flow away from the rig.  
After shutting the well, proper kill method needs to be implemented to kill/control 
the kick. Some type of constant bottom hole pressure method is usually used to control a 
kick, where heavier drilling fluid is pumped into the well to circulate the formation fluid 
out of the system. There are different types of well control methodologies, e.g., wait and 
weight method, driller’s method, reverse circulation. In managed pressure drilling, 
bottomhole pressure can be quickly adjusted/increased to an overbalanced condition by 
making necessary adjustments to choke. 
 
2.1.5. Well Intervention – Differences and Challenges 
 
Well control and blowout prevention approaches are different in well drilling and 
intervention operations. Blowout risk is significant in workover due to many factors, in 
fact, more deepwater well blowouts occurred in the past during well workover than during 
development drilling phase (Holland, 1997). Two major issue that makes the well 
intervention/workover operations critical are – 
▪ In well workover operations, pressurized producing zone is exposed and 
available for flow nearly 100% of the time, where in drilling the producing 
zone is exposed for a short period of time 
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▪ The conditions of casing and other sub-surface equipment can deteriorate over 
time which can be a big issue for well workover operations 
 Rike et al. (1990) identified sixteen key differences between well drilling and 
workover operations and suggested for having a robust well control program for well 
workover operations different than drilling well control program to prevent blowouts. 
Some of the key differences are discussed here – 
▪ In drilling, mud filter cake makes a very effective seal against formation to 
prevent influx/losses. Since solids-free fluids are used during workover similar 
seals doesn’t form and there can be continuous losses into the formation. 
▪ During no circulation or when the pumps are stopped, any influxes/gas travel 
toward the surface much quicker in most of the workover fluids than drilling 
mud.  
▪ The formation fracture pressure could be considerably less during well 
intervention/workover operations than that experienced during drilling 
operations due to reservoir depletion. 
▪ Trip tanks can provide indication of kicks for drilling mud systems, but they 
are less reliable for solids-free workover fluids due to constant presence of 
producing zone and casing open at the surface.  
If detected early, controlling a kick during well workover is generally less 
complicated when compared to drilling kicks. But if not planned carefully, some of these 
factors can make kick control and blowout prevention challenging in well workover 
operations. Low hydrostatic head, snubbing equipment failure, cement failure, kelly valve 
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failure, wireline lubricator failure and BOP failure were found to be the major causes of 
blowouts in well intervention/workover operations. 
   
2.2. Development and Application of Leading and Lagging Indicators 
 
2.2.1. Recommended Practices and Guidelines 
 
Several organization including the UK Health and Safety Executive (UK HSE), 
the American Petroleum Institute (API), the International Oil and Gas Producers (IOGP) 
and the Institution of Chemical Engineers (IChemE) published guidelines on developing 
process safety indicators for different organizations – upstream, downstream or general 
hazard organizations. In 2006, UK HSE published a Step-by-Step Guideline to Develop 
Process Safety Indicators for Major Hazard Industries (UK HSE, 2006). UK HSE defines 
leading indicators as active monitoring systems for operational and organizational controls 
placed to prevent any unwanted situation and lagging indicators as reactive measures 
which are the desired outcome the risk control system is designed to deliver. In this 
guideline the concept of dual assurance was introduced where leading and lagging 
indicators perform in combination in a structured and systematic way of defining each 
critical risk control factor.  
The Centre for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) published a guideline book on 
development and use of process safety metrics (CCPS, 2010) where safety metrics are 
defined as some observable measures and categorized into leading, lagging and near-miss 
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metrics. Later, in 2010, ANSI/API Recommended Practice 754: Process Safety 
Performance Indicators for the Refining and Petrochemical Industries (API, 2010) was 
published. The four-tier approach of safety performance indicators was introduced with 
Tier 1 being the most lagging and Tier 4 being the most leading aspects of events.  
Until this point, the guidelines mostly focused on downstream operations, but in 
2011 IOGP published a report (456) on Recommended Practice on Key Performance 
Indicators (IOGP, 2011) focusing on upstream operations. The proposed framework was 
built based on API RP-754 and guidelines published by UK HES, CCPS and OECD 
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development). IOGP recommends using 
API’s four-tier approach, but also provides guidance to support upstream operations and 
activities. Later in 2015, IChemE published a guidance document (IChemE, 2015) on 
leading process safety metrics for industries with hazardous activities. They developed 
comprehensive guidelines on selecting and tracking process safety lead metrics for six 
pre-classified organizational function areas, which are, knowledge and competence, 
engineering and design, systems and procedures, assurance, human factors and culture. 
Very recently, in 2016, IOGP published another report (556) (IOGP, 2016) on Process 
Safety – Leading key performance indicators as a supplement to report 456. This report 
emphasizes on API Tier-3 and Tier-4 process safety key performance indicators and 
includes discussion on the concepts of barrier management and monitoring using dual-
assurance approach which was initially proposed by UK HSE.  
All these recommended practices and guidelines are very useful in developing a 
safety indicators program for process plants but these are partly applicable to onshore and 
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offshore drilling and other well operations. Some of the shortcomings in applying the 
existing guidelines to drilling scenarios include – primary focus on production related 
losses in most of the guidelines (Wilkinson, 2012), emphasis on consequence-based 
approach rather than cause-based approach and use of process operations focused 
language and concepts in general (Wilkinson, 2012). 
 
2.2.2. Notable Works related to Drilling Operations 
 
Few analytical works have been carried out to develop leading indicators to predict 
and prevent blowout incidents.  One of the major works is the Trends in Risk Level in the 
Petroleum Activity (RNNP) project which analyzed and discussed major hazard indicators 
primarily for production installations. Vinnem et al. (2006) and Vinnem et al. (2010) 
discussed various aspects of RNNP works – identification and data collection for defined 
situations of hazard and incident (DSHA/DFU), development of risk model and finally 
development of incident and barrier indicators.  Almost similar to IOGP classification, the 
barrier elements were classified in two categories – technical systems and human and 
organizational factors. This study also outlined some critical questions regarding indicator 
validity, for example, which are the critical elements for evaluating barrier health, is the 
indicators really valid for the major incidents, does the indicator actually measure what 
needs to be measured etc. The whole study was conducted based on barrier test data of 
only two installations while it was suggested that more extensive studies are required for 
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assessing major incident risk for drilling operations with considering all the possible 
precursor events scenarios and associated barriers. 
Skogdalen et al. (2011) suggested extension of indicators developed in the RNNP 
project for monitoring and evaluating safety in drilling operations. Few significant areas 
were identified, such as well planning, well incident, well response, status of safety critical 
equipment, and others, and for some areas a set of indicators were proposed for 
consideration. For example, low mud weight, annular losses, and swabbing can serve as 
incident indicators, while time lapse between incident and response, evaluation of well 
response action, etc. can serve as indicators for the area of operator well response. Oien et 
al. (2012) and Skogdalen et al. (2011) discussed the scope of safety indicators to prevent 
catastrophic blowout incidents using the Deepwater Horizon incident as a test case. The 
issue of cement failure, misinterpretation of negative pressure test result, delay in kick 
detection and subsequent well control actions and finally failure of blowout preventer 
(BOP) – all these were deep rooted into organizational and operational practices which 
could be tracked by leading risk indicators.   
 
2.2.3. Approach of a High Reliability Organization 
 
Despite having a completely different type of business and activities, the drilling 
industry has some similarities with the aviation industry in terms of major hazard and risk 
undertaking and mode of operations. Both industries need more focus on leading 
indicators as major incidents are rare but the consequences are large, and in both cases 
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several stakeholders are involved to achieve a common goal. The latter is of great 
importance in drilling operations because less focus is given in the consistent interaction 
between different parties on a rig and this particular element came into discussion after 
almost every major incident.  
The similarities between aviation and drilling industries regarding multi-
stakeholder involvement is represented in Figure 5: 
. 
 
Figure 5 Multi-stakeholder involvement in aviation and drilling 
Reprinted with permission from Elsevier Ltd. Copyright 2017. 
 
The Aviation Safety and Certification of new Operations and Systems (ASCOS) 
framework for developing safety performance indicators for aviation systems (Roelen et 
al., 2014) defined indicators for four levels – technology, human, organizational and 
system of organizations. Where system of organizations represents the interaction and 
harmony among individual organizations needed to ensure safe and reliable operations. 
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To design and develop indicators for tracking the synchronization among the stakeholders 
in terms of operational performance and safety is certainly an interesting and useful 
concept. These indicators would allow one to monitor the interaction between different 
parties, i.e., operators, drilling contractors and manufacturers, on a drilling rig and ensure 
no compromise in safety performances at organizational interfaces. They identified major 
causal factors which may lead to catastrophic incidents and developed indicators to track 
and monitor different operational and organizational factors influencing the causal 
elements. Aviation industry focuses more on minimizing causes and implement learnings 
from near-miss events to prevent major incidents. 
 
2.3. Blowout Risk Assessment using Bayesian Network 
 
Bayesian network (BN) is a popular probabilistic method that has been widely 
used for safety and risk assessment of various complex systems over the past few years. It 
can represent probabilistic relationships among a set of variables and allows both 
predictive and diagnostic analysis. One of the biggest advantages of Bayesian network is 
its ability to handle complexity and uncertainty. This tool is gaining popularity for 
assessing safety and risk of drilling operations for its flexibility and wider applications. 
Khan et al. (2017) analyzed application of different methodologies for blowout risk 
assessment and identified Bayesian network as one of the strongest tools as they offer 
following advantages – 
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▪ Capability of incorporating new information/evidence and update the prior 
beliefs/probabilities 
▪ Capability to handle uncertainty, incomplete datasets, multistate variables, 
and complex causal relationships 
Bayesian approach was used for real-time problem detection while drilling a well 
(Hargreaves et al., 2001). This approach was found to be useful for dealing with noisy 
drilling data, and avoiding false alarms by modeling kick and non-kick events. Khakzad 
et al. (2013) used bow-tie and Bayesian network methods to perform quantitative risk 
analysis for offshore drilling operations. The research indicated the flexibility of BN tool 
as it can consider common cause failures and conditional probabilities and perform 
probability updating. Bayesian network method has also been used for assessing blowout 
scenarios for managed pressure drilling (MPD) and underbalanced drilling (UBD) 
(Abimbola et al., 2015). Bow-tie models were developed for each type of drilling cases 
and mapped into Bayesian networks for conducting risk analysis using failure data from 
literature. Similar analysis was performed for casing and cementing operations of a well 
(Abimbola et al., 2016). In another work, blowout flowcharts were converted into 
Bayesian networks to predict failure scenarios and potential consequences for MPD and 
UBD techniques (Bhandari et al., 2015). Earlier, Cai et al. (2013) proposed a five-steps 
methodology for translating flowcharts into Bayesian network. Five categories of 
influencing factors; human, hardware, software, mechanical, and hydraulic; were modeled 
using Bayesian networks to assess probability of failure on demand of subsea blowout 
preventer. Most of the works used historical failure data obtained from various data 
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3. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
 
3.1. Gaps and Challenges 
 
1. As discussed in the earlier Section (2.1.2), many works have been done to detect 
kicks early. Kick detection efficiency has improved over the time with 
technological advancements. But effective implementation of many of these 
technologies have been a big challenge due to several factors including cost, 
complexity and lack of adaptability of the existing drilling systems. So, kick 
detection process has still remained somewhat elementary for many of the drilling 
operations around the world. They rely on some conventional kick indicators 
which has proven to be ineffective in many of the past blowout incidents (e.g., 
Deepwater horizon blowout). But kick is not the initiating events for blowouts, 
they occur due to some failure of the primary barrier system. Which is preceded 
by some other events or leading indicators that can provide valuable information 
on the health and integrity of the total well control system. These indicators are 
mostly related to operational discipline, job planning, preparation, design and 
organizational safety culture. Even for the most advanced drilling rigs using a 
state-of-the-art kick detection technology, the accuracy and efficiency of the 
technology largely depend on influencing operational and organizational factors, 
e.g., maintenance, inspection, training and competency of the personnel. These 
factors indicate the reliability or vulnerability of the total kick detection and well 
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control system. Since blowout is a low frequency high consequence event, 
extensive focus is required on developing leading indicators to predict and prevent 
undesirable events. So, along with focusing on advanced kick detection and control 
technologies, a comprehensive leading indicators framework is required specific 
to drilling and other well operations for monitoring barrier performances and 
successfully predicting potential upsets or kicks. But the oil and gas industry are 
currently using a set of “accepted” indicators for development of a safety program 
whereas it is believed that to prevent a catastrophic event, a more exhaustive and 
detailed approach is required.  
 
2. Many of the blowout incidents, e.g., Montara in 2009 and Deepwater Horizon in 
2010 showed that, there were early indications of potential abnormalities both from 
organizational and operational perspectives. The lagging indicator data showed 
good safety records prior to the incidents but didn’t reveal the vulnerabilities 
within the safety system. Actual risk for both of the cases was pretty high due to 
impaired barrier conditions. Such faults could be identified with an extensive 
leading indicators program and it is believed that the consequences of such 
blowouts could have been lessened or minimized with appropriate focus on safety 
performance indicators or leading indicators. 
 
3. The recommended practices and guidelines discussed in section 2.2.1 are very 
useful in developing a safety indicators program for general process industries, but 
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these are partly applicable to well drilling operations. Some of the shortcomings 
in applying the existing guidelines to well drilling scenarios include (Wilkinson, 
2012) –  
▪ Most of the guidelines primarily focused on production related losses  
▪ Majority of the emphasis was made on consequence-based approach rather 
than cause-based approach  
▪ Use of process operations focused language and concepts in general  
Due to major differences between general process operations and well drilling or 
intervention operations, it is essential to have a robust guideline and framework 
for developing leading indicators program specific to well drilling and intervention 
operations. 
 
4. Since well control performance is heavily governed by technical, operational and 
organizational factors, it is essential to consider all of these factors together in 
integrated models for assessing blowout risk. Some good works have been done to 
assess risks of blowouts or major well control events, but very little emphasis has 
been made on developing predictive models using leading indicators information 
which could demonstrate a more realistic scenario. Leading indicators can provide 
early information on chances of encountering an event that can cause barrier/s to 
fail. They can identify weak points in a system that need to be improved for 
avoiding such failures. This information can be collected from job planning, 
preparation and execution phases. So, if integrated in probabilistic models, they 
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can provide valuable information on potential failure of well control barriers 
specific to a certain job. But the major challenge in achieving this, is to combine 
these diverse set of data in same models and translate the information into 
probabilistic values.  
 
3.2. Research Roadmap 
 
Based on the gaps and challenges discussed in the earlier section following 
research objectives have been identified – 
 
1. Development of a general framework for identifying sets of leading indicators to 
predict kicks and blowouts  
a. Define and categorize leading indicators 
b. Propose a systematic methodology for identifying sets leading indicators 
and identify categorized sets of leading indicators for drilling, completion 
and workover activities 
c. Perform case studies to assess the applicability of the proposed framework 
2. Construct leading indicators-based decision support algorithms and predictive 
models  
a. Construct decision support algorithms using real-time indicators 
b. Develop predictive models correlating different levels of leading indicators 
to evaluate probabilities of primary barrier failure 
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3.2.1. Leading Indicators Framework 
 
A general framework is required for well operations which can be applied 
regardless of operational phases, e.g., drilling, completion, production, surveillance and 
workover. Leading indicators need to be defined clearly and categorized appropriately 
based on the circumstances and the nature of information they may provide. The 
recommended practices and guidelines published by UK HSE, API, IOGP and IChemE 
discussed in section 2.2.1, are excellent sources for understanding the characteristics of 
leading indicators and their application.  
Once defined and categorized, a step-by-step guide is required for identifying 
appropriate sets of leading indicators. Aviation industry has a practice of analyzing 
potential failure causes and initiating events to identify critical issues that need to be 
monitored. This could be a viable practice for well operations as well, because the first 
step of preventing blowout events is to making sure that the barrier functions are not being 
compromised. The next task is to take the proposed methodology and develop sets of 
leading indicators for different barrier systems during drilling, completion and well 
workover/intervention operations. 
The proposed framework also needs to be assessed for their applicability. To 
accomplish that, past blowout incidents can be analyzed from a perspective of the 
proposed leading indicators framework. This study should provide information on whether 
the proposed framework could be useful for identifying suitable leading indicators that 
could have provided early information on potential upsets. 
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3.2.2. Algorithms and Predictive Models 
 
As drilling, completion and workovers are complex processes, only having discrete 
sets of leading indicators may not be sufficient for preventing well control events. They 
need to be integrated together for providing realistic information of the well control system 
and potential events. For example, kicks can be identified by carefully observing changes 
in certain process parameters. If algorithms are developed combining these parameters 
with necessary actions and further observations to confirm kick, that can be very useful 
for identifying kicks timely and efficiently using information obtained from the process 
observables.  
But for evaluating potential barrier failure scenario, a more holistic approach is 
needed. Probabilities of barrier failure or kick initiating events can be assessed by 
correlating organizational, operational and real-time indicators. Bayesian network is 
believed to be an appropriate tool for handling these diverse set of information by 
translating these to some probability functions.  
 
 




As indicated in Figure 6, probability of a kick initiating event can be determined 
by analyzing influencing organizational factors and operational performance indicators. 
Kicks can be detected by observing changes of certain process parameters. But whether 
the changes could be effectively detected or not, that depends on how the kick detection 
system is designed and managed. These issues are governed by relevant organizational 
factors and safety culture. This correlation is very critical because it could identify 
vulnerabilities in a kick detection system along with probabilities of barrier failure and 
kick events. For assessing well control performance, different sets of algorithms and 




4. DEVELOPING LEADING INDICATORS FRAMEWORK** 
 
4.1. Definition and Categorization 
 
Even though various definitions of leading indicators have been adopted in 
different guidelines, the basic notion is the same – they are proactive measures. The 
following key characteristics were outlined by analyzing the definitions provided in 
various sources, e.g., API, UK HSE, IOGP and IChemE. Leading indicators – 
 
• are considered to be a predictive set of parameters/course of actions, 
• should deliver early information on barrier performance, 
• must be measurable and recognizable, and 
• should indicate and benchmark operational and organizational performances. 
 
Based on these features and considering complexities of onshore and offshore well 
operations following definition has been proposed:  
                                                 
* Tamim, N., Laboureur, D. M., Mentzer, R. A., Hasan, A. R., & Mannan, M. S. (2017). A framework for 
developing leading indicators for offshore drillwell blowout incidents. Process Safety and Environmental 
Protection, 106, 256-262. Copyright 2017 Institution of Chemical Engineers. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
Part of this section and figures are reprinted with permission from Elsevier Ltd. 
 
* Tamim, N., Laboureur, D. M., Hasan, A. R., & Mannan, M. S. (2019). Developing leading indicators-
based decision support algorithms and probabilistic models using Bayesian network to predict kicks while 
drilling. Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 121, 239-246. Copyright 2018 Institution of 
Chemical Engineers. Published by Elsevier B.V. Part of this section and figures are reprinted with 
permission from Elsevier Ltd. 
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“A leading indicator provides early observable signs of threat from any event 
which may compromise the safety of a process, personnel or the environment, by 
progression to an undesirable state or value”.  
It should be noted that leading indicators is a general term and based on the 
characteristics function and application, different industries use different terminologies - 
process safety leading indicators or lead metrics, leading risk indicators, leading 
performance indicators etc. Ultimately, they represent to a safety performance scenario or 
operational risk level. 
For drilling, completion or well intervention activities, leading indicators can 
primarily be categorized into two different groups as shown in the Figure 7 – real-time 
indicators/process observables and indicators based on operational and organizational 
performance. Traditionally, the latter are considered as leading indicators in general and 
it has three different categories – operational, human and organizational, and system of 
organization. The category ‘system of organization’ is adopted from the aviation industry 
practice as discussed in the earlier section. The organizational factors mostly cover design, 
planning, preparations and competency issues where the operational factors include 
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4.2. Step-by-Step Process for Developing Sets of Leading Indicators 
 
Based on the definition and categorization proposed in Section 4.1, a systematic 
cause-based approach was proposed for establishing comprehensive sets of leading 
indicators which can be represented with Figure 8:  
 
 
Figure 8 Flow diagram for identifying sets of leading indicators 
Reprinted with permission from Elsevier Ltd. Copyright 2018. 
 
Different sets of indicators can be identified by analyzing operational scenarios 
that could lead to major events. At the beginning, indicators can be developed upon 
studying possible initiating causes/events (technical or operational issues). Then 
subsequent analysis can be performed to correlate the technical or operational failures with 
operational performance and eventually underlying organizational factors can be 
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identified which are responsible for the incident. For each of the categories, appropriate 
sets of indicators can be established to track the elements affecting the safety and integrity 
of the total system. Initiating events and causal factors can be identified by conducting 
fault-tree analysis and from past incident data. This framework can be adopted for any 
operations or systems. In this study, this is applied to well drilling, completion and 
intervention activities. 
 
4.2.1. Sets of Leading Indicators for Drilling and Completion Phases 
 
To better understand the causes of blowouts and related barriers, a bow-tie diagram 
was constructed (Figure 9). This diagram summarizes how kick is initiated and escalated 
to a blowout event. Failure of hydrostatic head (or Pressure Control Equipment for 
managed pressure drilling) and/or cement can initiate kicks. Kicks can be further escalated 
to major well control events with failure of other well control elements, e.g., plugs and 
packers, casing/liner. Blowout preventer (BOP) and/or valve arrangements are used to kill 
the kicks and regain control of the well. Failure of this secondary set of barriers can cause 
catastrophic blowout. Major failure causes of primary barriers have been represented in 
the clouds and physical observables for kick detection have also been included in this 




Figure 9 Bow-tie diagram 
Reprinted with permission from Elsevier Ltd. Copyright 2018. 
 
Hydrostatic head is considered to be the primary barrier for majority of well 
drilling and completion operations. Many of the catastrophic blowouts in the past were 
initiated from low hydrostatic head events. A fault-tree analysis (Figure 10) was 
performed to identify the major causes of this crucial barrier failure. 
By following the steps described in the earlier section, sets of leading indicators 
are developed for drilling and completion phases. Each of the failure causes were carefully 
analyzed to understand their impacts on process observables that can serve as real-time 
indicators for kicks and blowouts. Operational issues and complexities that can arise due 
to these failures were also assessed thoroughly. Finally, the underlying organizational 
factors that could lead to such failures and escalate well control issues were identified. 
The operational issues and organizational factors were then converted to appropriate 
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leading indicators which can be evaluated for assessing performance of hydrostatic head 
barrier.  The combined list of indicators is presented in Table 2.  
 
 
Figure 10 Fault tree analysis for hydrostatic head barrier failure 
 
 
Different aspects of organizational factors were considered in this study. Two 
events need to occur for a barrier to fail and kick to happen – presence of an initiating 
cause and failure to detect any abnormal conditions. For example, abnormal pore pressure 
is one of the major causes of hydrostatic head failure during drilling. Availability of 
accurate information (from seismic survey, offset well data) while planning of drilling 
operation is very crucial to avoid such events. Again, maintenance practices, inspection 
process, drilling procedures and competency of personnel are some other critical factors 
that could indicate vulnerability and resiliency of the system.   
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Table 2 List of leading indicators for monitoring primary barrier (hydrostatic head) 
performance. Reprinted with permission from Elsevier Ltd. Copyright 2018. 
 
Event Low hydrostatic head 
Initiating 
Causes 
Abnormal pore pressure, Swabbing, Improper fill, Mud loss, Low 
mud weight, Circulating system failure 
Barrier 
Element 






▪ Drilling break/increase in rate of penetration 
▪ Pit gain 
▪ Flow differential 
▪ Changes in pump pressure 
▪ Changes in mud density 
▪ Trip tank volume differential 





▪ Number of times operational limits exceeded 
▪ Number of unplanned mud density adjustments 
▪ Number of unplanned pump flow rate adjustments 
▪ Number of times well went to underbalanced condition 
▪ Number of times separator high/low level alarm activated 
▪ Number of times mud pressure drops within 5% of pore pressure 
▪ Number of times mud pressure rises within 5% of fracture pressure 





                                                 
† D-exponent is an extrapolation of drilling parameters that estimate pressure gradient  
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▪ Geo hazards survey 
▪ Availability of offset well data 
▪ Resemblance with offset well conditions 
▪ Geo hazards contingency plans 
▪ Learning from prior events – repetitive incidents/near-misses 
▪ Experience in current position 
▪ Competency profile and training program evaluation 
▪ Meantime between mud density measurements 
▪ Arrangements for mud tank volume monitoring 
▪ Arrangements for mud property measurement 
▪ Overdue maintenance/function test items 
▪ Number of maintenance non-conformities identified 
▪ Number of work order generated for corrective maintenance 
▪ Overdue audit/incident investigation action items 
▪ Number of failures or defects found during routine inspection 
▪ Overdue hazard analysis action items 
▪ Number of times MOC process is exempt or not followed 
▪ Number of plan changes without formal risk assessment 
▪ Number of violations/deviations from original drilling plan 





▪ Number of safety meetings held among different parties 
▪ Inadequate assessment of contractor training and competency 
▪ Common agreement on proposed drilling and well design plans 
and subsequent adjustments 





Another set of indicators represent job preparations for not only preventing the 
influxes, but also detecting them timely and efficiently. On the other hand, indicators 
based on operational issues are the events that indicate overall operational discipline and 
complexities that could arise from the presence/occurrence any of the initiating causes of 
barrier failure. 
Cement is another very crucial barrier for preventing influxes from the reservoir. 
Depending on the operational phase or the job being performed, cement can act as both 
primary or secondary barrier. Abimbola et al. (2016) conducted a comprehensive 
assessment on cementing operations and their potential failure causes. Based on that work, 
a fault-tree analysis (Figure 11) was performed to identify failure causes of cements. 
Influxes due to cement failure may occur due to poor cement job and failure to evaluate 
integrity of the cement. Formation fracture while placing cement may also initiate kicks.  
By following the methodology proposed in the earlier section, sets of leading 
indicators were identified to monitor cement performance as a well control barrier. 
Proposed sets of leading indicators have been presented in Table 3. The real-time 
observables and relevant organizational factors for influxes due to cementing failure are 




Figure 11 Fault tree analysis for cement failure 
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Table 3 List of leading indicators for monitoring cementing performance 
 




▪ Full return of mud 
▪ Increase in annular pressure 
▪ Pipe stand-off ratio 





▪ Extent of pre-job testing 
▪ Inadequate cement slurry testing 
▪ Simulation of cementing 
▪ Availability of reservoir data 
▪ Absence of a critical equipment 
▪ Inadequate cement slurry formulation 
▪ Lack of formation evaluation 
▪ Experience in current position 
▪ Training and competency profile 
▪ Quality of cement bond log 
▪ Quality of negative pressure test 





4.2.2. Sets of Leading Indicators for Well Intervention Operations 
 
As discussed in Section 1 and 2, there are different types of well intervention 
operations including workover, wireline/slickline, coiled tubing and snubbing jobs. Most 
of the leading indicators discussed in Section 4.2.1 are applicable to well workover 
operations as well. The barrier arrangement in wireline and slickline operations are 
slightly different from what have been discussed in this section. 
In wireline or slickline operations, stuffing box and/or pressurized grease head 
work as primary barrier elements. The stuffing box generally contains rubber packing 
which is tightened to seal around the cable/wire. Pressurized grease may also be used to 
prevent hydrocarbon leakage depending on the operations. Hydrocarbon release may also 
initiate due to lubricator failure. Wellhead tree valves are used as secondary barriers to 
prevent any well control events. Depending on the phase of operations or type of 
emergency wireline BOP may also be used to control the well. A well control event may 
occur due to failure of primary and/or secondary set of barriers or lubricator failure. 
Initiating causes of major well control events during wireline/slickline operations can be 
represented with the fault-tree diagram in Figure 12.
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Figure 12 Fault tree analysis of well control events while wireline operations 
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Potential operational issues and underlying organizational factors for the initiating 
causes of well control barrier failures while conducting wireline operations were analyzed. 
Major organizational factors include – inadequate planning and job safety assessment, 
design failure, lack of competency, inadequate inspection and maintenance, inadequate 
function and pressure testing. Operating outside planned operational envelope, procedural 
violations, number of on-job complications, e.g., tool stuck, are examples of operational 
issues that may cause an incident to initiate. These factors were converted into quantifiable 
indicators that could indicate organizational and operational performances and 
shortcomings. Integrity of well control barrier system while conducting wireline 
operations can be assessed by carefully evaluating the indicators. A list of potential leading 
indicators for assessing wireline operations has been presented in Table 4. Grease-
head/stuffing box, lubricator, wireline BOP and wellhead tree valves were considered as 




Table 4 List of leading indicators for monitoring barrier performance during 
wireline operations 
 
Event Uncontrolled hydrocarbon release 
Barrier 
Elements 






▪ Operating outside planned envelope 
▪ Need for frequent packing/pressure adjustments 
▪ Number of tool stuck issues 





▪ On job experience 
▪ Training and competency profile 
▪ Overdue maintenance items 
▪ Ratio of corrective maintenance over preventive maintenance 
▪ Number of bypassed inspection items 
▪ Extent of pre-job inspection 
▪ Number of overdue function test items 
▪ Number of failures during function tests 
▪ Number of expired pressure test certification 
▪ Number of overdue valve integrity tests 
▪ Performing grease quality check 






4.3. Case Studies 
 
Two blowout incidents have been studied to assess whether leading indicators 
could have provided early warnings about blowouts or not. Several organizational and 
operational issues were identified for both of the incidents which could be revealed by 
appropriate sets of leading indicators. The blowout incidents analyzed were Montara and 
Macondo/Deepwater Horizon. 
 
4.3.1. Montara Blowout [2009] 
 
H1 well of the Montara Wellhead Platform in the Timor Sea, Australia, kicked and 
uncontrolled hydrocarbon started to flow on August 21, 2009 (Borthwick, 2010). The 
report of the Montara Commission of Inquiry (Borthwick, 2010) revealed a series of 
operational and organizational issues and failures that led to this disaster. On March 2009, 
operations on the well were temporarily suspended with barriers – cemented casing shoe, 
pressure containing anti-corrosion caps (PCCC) and overbalanced well fluid. The integrity 
of each of these barriers was compromised and the well control system failed to prevent 
influx of hydrocarbons into the wellbore and eventually to the environment. A leading risk 
indicator program could have predicted ongoing disorders and vulnerabilities of the well 
control system. A pressure test was conducted after installation of the cemented casing 
shoe.  Volume and pressure data showed some discrepancies which indicated possible 
leakage through the float valves. Two anti-corrosion caps (PCCC) were planned to be 
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installed instead of cement plugs, where PCCC is not a recognized well control barrier. 
Even, one of the anti-corrosion caps (PCCC) were not been installed which caused 
corrosion in the casing thread and complicated the completion operations. A proper risk 
assessment program could have identified the incompatibility of PCCCs as a well control 
barrier, and an effective inspection and audit program could have revealed the issue of 
non-installation of the PCCC. Again, the density of casing fluid was not sufficient to 
balance the formation pressure and the absence of a long-term barrier monitoring program 
allowed the incident to develop. 




Figure 13 Barrier diagram for Montara blowout 
Reprinted with permission from Elsevier Ltd. Copyright 2017. 
 
As per the report (Borthwick, 2010), there were several early signs of potential 
well control event which had not been considered or investigated. Again, several 
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operational and organizational factors indicated lack of integrity of the well control and 
barrier management system. This incident was analyzed from the perspective of the 
leading indicators framework discussed in earlier section. And, relevant real-time 
indicators and leading operational and organizational factors for this incident have been 
presented in Table 5. This clearly shows the critical necessity of shifting focus towards 
leading indicators to successfully predict and prevent catastrophic incidents. 
 
Table 5 List of Potential Leading Indicators for Montara Incident 











flow volume - 
Pumped 9.25 
bbl of fluids; 
16.5 bbl 
returned 


















▪ Absence of BOP, diverter 
system or any independent 
secondary barrier 
▪ Change of plan without 
formal risk assessment; lack 
of compliance with MOC 
system 
▪ Improper well barrier 
management system and risk 
assessment - Installation of 
PCCC instead of cement 
plug 
▪ Lack inspection of 
compliance audit and system 














4.3.2. Deepwater Horizon Blowout [2010] 
 
Deepwater Horizon blowout is considered to be one of the most catastrophic 
incidents in recent history.  This incident led to 11 fatalities, 17 injuries and severe 
environmental damage (Counsel, C., 2011). Failure in cementing caused hydrocarbons to 
enter the wellbore and misinterpretation of pressure test results allowed further escalation. 
The blowout preventer (BOP) failed to prevent the influx from escalating to the blowout 
event.  The attempt to completely seal the well by the blind shear ram was not successful 
due to the off-centered drill pipe. This incident points out the need for establishing better 
approaches to manage hazards, minimize risks and uncertainties associated with 
deepwater drilling activities. Relevant real-time indicators and leading operational and 




Table 6 List of Potential leading Indicators for Deepwater Horizon Blowout.  























▪ Deviations and 
abnormalities 
- Higher pressure 
required to 
activate float 







▪ Inconsistent BOP 
test and inspection 
results 
▪ Safety critical activities 
performed without formal 
procedure – negative 
pressure test 
▪ Change of well plan 
without formal risk 
assessment – no cement 
bond log, less centralizers 
used than originally 
planned for, no bottom up 
circulation 
▪ Lack of compliance with 
MOC process 
▪ Inadequate instructions and 
well control procedure 
▪ Simultaneous operations in 
mud tank system – couldn’t 
notice pit gain 















A general framework for identifying and developing sets of leading indicators have 
been proposed and discussed in this section. The framework was primarily developed for 
well operations. But the proposed cause-based methodology has given the framework such 
adaptability and robustness that it can be applied effectively to any processes or 
operations. Drilling, completion and well intervention operations were assessed 
thoroughly for developing suitable sets of indicators by following the proposed systematic 
approach.  
For drilling and completion activities, only primary barriers were analyzed since 
the principal focus of this study was on kick prevention. Due to the complex nature of 
drilling and completion activities, hydrostatic head and cementing barriers were assessed 
individually. Among different types of well intervention activities, wireline operations 
were analyzed due to its differences in well control barrier system compared to other well 
operations. Detailed analysis was performed to identify key causal factors for failure of 
the critical barriers while drilling, completion and well intervention operations. Each of 
the key causal factors were carefully analyzed to develop sets of leading indicators by 
following the step-by-step methodology proposed in this work. It should be noted that, the 
proposed set of indicators is not uniform; rather a mixture of percentage, numbers and 
observations due to their nature of use and application. This may not be a concrete list and 
some of the indicators may not apply for certain cases where some additional indicators 
can be added based on the operational circumstances. 
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Proposed leading indicators can be defined and expressed differently based on 
their features. But for each of the indicators certain criteria needs to be set to identify 
acceptable and unacceptable region. For example, indicators can be expressed in terms of 
their vigor or performance level – low, medium and high. One of the major benefits of 
using performance state/level for denoting leading indicators is, any observation or 
percentage can be easily transferred into different states or levels based on industry best 
practices or expectations.  
Indicators which are directly measurable with numbers or convertible to 
percentages can be easily represented by performance states, e.g., number of overdue 
maintenance items. If no maintenance is overdue the observation of this indicator is ‘low’ 
which represents best possible performance. ‘Medium’ and ‘high’ states of overdue 
maintenance can also be defined based on criticality and expectations. But for the 
indicators based on observation or scenario assessment, clear criterion needs to set for 
each of the performance states. For example, one of the leading indicators for determining 
efficiency of kick detection system during drilling can be - arrangements for mud 
properties measurements. This item cannot be measured directly with numbers. This 
indicator can have different components which can be defined as represented in Table 7. 
Other indicators can be defined and represented in similar manner for uniformity.  
It should be noted that, this table is just an example of how the leading indicators 





Table 7 Example for defining leading indicators with performance states 
 
Arrangements for Mud 
Properties Measurements  
Reliability/Performance 
High Medium Low 
Mean-time between mud density 
measurement 
<10 min 10-30 min >30 min 
Mean-time between gas content 
measurement 
<10 min 10-30 min >30 min 
Stand-by equipment for property 
measurements 
1 or more 
None, but have 
contingencies 
None 
Simultaneous activities impacting 
mud property measurement 
None 
Yes, but no 
immediate impact 
Yes 
*The numbers presented in this table are for demonstration purposes only, and do not 
represent industry practices.  
 
To demonstrate importance of leading indicators and assess the applicability of the 
proposed framework, a couple of case studies were performed. For Montara blowout, 
inadequate job planning, change in drilling plan without proper risk assessment and 
inadequate inspection were found to be the underlying organizational issues that 
contributed towards the incident. Non-installation of one of the critical pressure control 
equipment and insufficient density of the overbalance fluid were some of the key 
operational failures. Again, drilling contractors did not have proper communication and 
understanding with the owner and other service providers on changing well design and 
drilling plans. All these factors could have identified with proper sets of leading indicators 
as discussed in Section 4.3.1.  
Similarly, for Deepwater Horizon blowout incident, multiple operational and 
organizational issues had existed before the blowout. For example, cement failure was 
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believed to be the initiating event for the kick which was escalated to a catastrophic 
blowout event after a series of additional failures. Less centralizers were used than 
originally planned for a cementing job which was considered to be critical given the casing 
arrangements. This change in plan was not assessed thoroughly. Addition to this, the 
cement slurry formation was found to be poor and unstable, which could not provide 
proper isolation. Cement bond log was not run to save time, which could have identified 
potential issues with the cementing job. And, negative pressure test results were not 
properly interpreted and the test itself was performed without formal procedure. Finally, 
the temporary abandonment procedure was finalized at the last minute without proper risk 
assessment, which caused the well to go underbalance with insufficient well control 
barriers. The rig personnel failed to detect the kick early as they could not notice the pit 
gain due to simultaneous operations at the pit tank. All these factors were deeply rooted 
into organizational safety culture and proper sets of leading indicators could have 
identified the weaknesses in the well control system caused by the series of changes in 
drilling and testing plans. Again, complications during cement placing and changes in 
process paraments including drill pipe pressure further indicated towards a potential 
failure which were also overlooked.  
A carefully developed leading indicators program could have provided a holistic 
picture of the well control program and barrier health for both of the incidents. These 
analyses clearly show the critical necessity of shifting focus towards leading indicators for 
successfully predicting and preventing catastrophic incidents. 
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5. DECISION SUPPORT ALGORITHMS AND PREDICTIVE MODELS* 
 
5.1. Decision Support Algorithms 
 
As identified in Table 2, several real-time indicators or process parameters can be 
tracked for predicting and detecting kicks while drilling. Some of these are considered to 
be primary indicators (e.g., pit gain, flow differential) which provide confirm signs of 
kicks. And some are secondary indicators (e.g., rate of change in penetration, changes in 
pump pressure) which may not always indicate a confirmed kick scenario but provide 
early warnings of something abnormal. To relate these indicators with a kick scenario 
several algorithms are constructed – which can aid effective decision-making during 
drilling operations. 
The algorithm in Figure 14 was constructed for drilling process where abnormal 
pore pressure is considered to be a major contributor of risk. 
                                                 
* Tamim, N., Laboureur, D. M., Hasan, A. R., & Mannan, M. S. (2019). Developing leading indicators-
based decision support algorithms and probabilistic models using Bayesian network to predict kicks while 
drilling. Process Safety and Environmental Protection, 121, 239-246. Copyright 2018 Institution of 
Chemical Engineers. Published by Elsevier B.V. Part of this section and figures are reprinted with 




Figure 14 Kick detection algorithm for drilling 
Reprinted with permission from Elsevier Ltd. Copyright 2018. 
 
This algorithm shows the sequence of warning signs and indicators if the drilling 
process hits an abnormal pressure zone and formation fluid starts to come into the 
wellbore. The left side of the flow diagram represents the increasing intensity of the kick 
with time. It is obvious that the earlier the kick is detected from the real-time observables 
the lesser the kick intensity would be. For example, in case of a gas kick, ‘pit gain’ means 
the formation fluid has already reached closer to the surface facility as dissolved gas has 
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started to come out of the drilling mud. But for oil/water (incompressible fluids) kick pit 
gain might be observed at an earlier phase when oil/water enters the wellbore and starts 
displacing the mud. 
Similar algorithm is developed for tripping out operations. Tripping out generally 
refers to pulling the drillstring out of the drilled hole. Swabbing is the major risk 




Figure 15 Kick detection algorithm for tripping operations 





Improper fill would be the first indication of a developing kick scenario and ‘flow 
check’ is a common practice to check for kicks. The earlier the trip tank volume 
differential is identified the better and that would allow some extra time to handle the kick. 
 
5.2. Predictive Models 
 
Comprehensive predictive models were developed correlating different levels of 
leading indicators to evaluate probabilities of kick initiating events or primary barrier 
failure. As discussed in Section 4, fault tree analysis was performed to identify the key 
causal factors for well control barrier failures. A Bayesian network (BN) tool was used to 
construct the models. Agenarisk, a software for constructing Bayesian network and 
modeling risk and uncertainty, was used to construct leading indicators-based probabilistic 
models for assessing –  
- Occurrence probabilities of causal elements (abnormal pore pressure and 
swabbing for hydrostatic head failure) 
- Failure probability of a barrier (cementing) 
- Probability of major well control event (for wireline operations) 
These models allow both predictive (cause to effect) and diagnostic (effect to 
cause) reasoning.  Bayesian network models can make optimum predictions by combining 
different types of information including system specific data, expert judgement and 
generic information. Due to unavailability of leading indicators data for drilling 
operations, probability distributions of the indicator elements were assumed in this study, 
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based on the learnings from past incidents, literature review and expert judgement. The 
methodology for constructing leading indicators-based probabilistic models can be 
represented with the flow-chart in Figure 16. 
In this study, indicators and the final events (barrier failure or causal factors for 
barrier failure) were denoted with ranked nodes. Ranked nodes enable using non-uniform 
indicators together in a same platform for comprehensive assessment. The states of the 
discrete variables (e.g., indicators) can be represented on ordinal scales using the ranked 
nodes. The ordinal scales can then be mapped into bounded numerical scale. For example, 
all the ranked nodes can be defined with a unit interval of [0-1] scale. If three-point scale 
or three performance states (low, medium and high) are used the width for each state 
would be 1/3 - which were used in this study. Thus, the associated intervals for different 
states can be expressed as – 
Low: [0 – 0.333] 
Medium: [0.333 – 0.666] 











In the software interface, that was used in this study, the labeled states were 
displayed rather than the numeric one, but the numerical values were used to calculate the 
associated probabilities and generating node probability tables (NPT).  
For example, operational performance (B) while conventional drilling can be 
evaluated with two indicators – number of unplanned mud density adjustments (A1) and 
number of times mud pressure/bottomhole pressure falls within 5% of the formation 
pressure (A2) as represented in Figure 17: 
 
 
Figure 17 Example of using indicators in Bayesian network 
 
 
These nodes can be denoted with truncated normal (TNormal) distributions, which 
have finite end points. So, the indicator nodes can be defined as – 
TNormal (µ, σ2, 0, 1); where, µ = mean and σ2 = variance 
To measure the contributions of the parent nodes (indicators) on the child nodes 
(indicators/events), a weighted sum model was used, which can be represented as – 




2, 0, 1]; where, Wi is weightage factor 
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To construct the base models, probability distributions (mean and variance) for 
each of the parent nodes were assigned along with appropriate weightage factors for better 
correlation. The assigned values have been shown in Table 8 – 
 








Number of unplanned mud density 
adjustments 
1 0.15 0.01 
Number of times mud pressure drops 
within 5% of formation pressure 
2 0.2 0.01 
 
The probability distributions for ‘low’, ‘medium’ or ‘high’ operational 
performance, P(B|A), for this scenario has been shown in Figure 18: 
 
 





Same principles were applied in the large models to denote the indicator nodes. In 
this study, informed assumptions were made to assign the variances of both the parent and 
child nodes. The variances of the child nodes can also be estimated by taking the inverse 






To reduce model “washing out” affect, which can be caused due to deep 
hierarchical ranked nodes, indicators were grouped into smaller segments/factors and then 
the combined effect was modeled in this study. 
For denoting the process observables, continuous interval type nodes were used. 
Event nodes (barrier failure or causal factor) were converted to continuous interval to 
connect with these observable nodes. Also, to correlate the process observable nodes with 
relevant performance indicators, intermediate nodes were used which were defined as 
‘impact factors’. For example, these correlations can be represented by Figure 19. 
If kick occurs due to abnormal pore pressure, return mud flow would increase as 
the downhole mud would be displaced by the influx (for water-based mud system). 
Whether the flow difference would be timely detected or not that depends on the 
arrangement and accuracy of flow measurement devices and driller’s experience. Mud 
flow can also be impacted due to lost circulation, which could further impact kick 
detection efficiency. For better estimation, mud flow differential was denoted with 
continuous interval and thus the correlated nodes had to be converted into continuous 





Figure 19 Example of integrating process observables with leading indicators 
 
 
For continuous interval type nodes, the cumulative density function of a variable 
X, with probability distribution function f(X), can be represented as – 
F(X) = ∫ 𝑓(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
𝑥
−∞
  and,  ∫ 𝑓(𝑡)𝑑𝑡
∞
−∞
 = 1 
And, for the range of values of X can be defined as [m, n], the probability that X 
lies in this range can be expressed as – 




In this study, normal distributions were used to denote probabilities of the changes 
in the process observables due to occurrence of kick initiating events/barrier failure causal 
factors. For some of the models, ranked nodes of the final elements were converted to 





5.2.1. Drilling and Completion 
 
As discussed in Section 4, hydrostatic head is considered to be the primary barrier 
for majority of the drilling operations. A fault-tree analysis (Figure 20) was performed to 
assess the failure probability of hydrostatic head and to identify major contributors for 
failure of this crucial barrier. Abnormal pore pressure and swabbing were found to be the 
major contributors for low hydrostatic head.  
 
 
Figure 20 Fault-tree analysis for low hydrostatic head event 
Reprinted with permission from Elsevier Ltd. Copyright 2018. 
 
It should be noted that, the failure probabilities of initiating/parent events were 
collected from various data sources (Khakzad et al., 2013, Bhandari et al., 2015, 
Rathnayaka et al., 2013 and Abimbola et al., 2014), where different drilling scenarios 
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were taken into consideration (e.g., deepwater, shallow water, different reservoir 
conditions, type of drilling). So, there are certain uncertainties involved with the calculated 
values.    
Since abnormal pore pressure and swabbing are the major contributors for low 
hydrostatic head or mud column failure, these two causal factors were further studied with 
proposed sets of leading indicators. Suitable sets of leading indicators for evaluating 
barrier failure due to abnormal pore pressure event were identified from Table 2 in section 
4.2.1. The leading indicators model developed to assess the occurrence probability of the 
event of abnormal pore pressure has been shown in Figure 21. In this model, two different 
types of leading indicators, organizational factors and operational performance issues, 
were integrated to determine the probability of encountering an abnormal pore pressure 
scenario. Organizational factors mostly reflect drilling preparations, planning, inspection, 




Figure 21 Leading indicators model – Loss of hydrostatic head due to abnormal pore pressure 
Reprinted with permission from Elsevier Ltd. Copyright 2018.
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If drilling hits an abnormal pore pressure zone and influx happens due to 
underbalanced conditions, it would trigger some changes in the process observables. 
These observables can serve as real-time indicators for kick identification. The probability 
distributions for observing changes in real-time parameters when a kick is developing due 
to abnormal pore pressure were also incorporated in this model. These parameters are 
function of both abnormal pore pressure event and some impact factors (e.g., 
presence/accuracy of measurement devices) which are largely influenced by the 
organizational safety culture.  
Similar assessment was conducted for well swabbing event which can cause 
influxes while tripping out of the hole (Figure 22). Design of drillstring and bit, job 
planning, job preparations and competency are the key organizational factors that 
influence probability of swabbing a well while pulling out of the hole. Since, this is a no 
circulation condition, detecting a kick can be particularly challenging. Monitoring trip 





Figure 22 Leading indicators model- Loss of hydrostatic head due to swabbing 
Reprinted with permission from Elsevier Ltd. Copyright 2018.
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Cement has multiple functions including creating zonal isolation by sealing off the 
annular space to prevent movement of well fluids, support the casing and closing off 
abandoned portion of the well. The process of cementing is complex and requires careful 
planning and preparation, precise execution and thorough evaluation. As discussed in 
Section 4, cement failure can be grouped into two categories – failure to achieve proper 
isolation and failure to evaluate cement integrity. Pre-job testing, preparation, job design 
and competency of personnel are crucial factors in achieving effective zonal isolation. 
Proper use of critical equipment including centralizer, float collar, float shoe and spacer 
are essential for success of cementing operation. Return of displaced mud, plug setting 
time, pipe stand-off ratio and change in annular pressure during cementing operation could 
indicate potential issues in cement placement. Cement evaluation is very critical as it 
cannot be inspected directly. Thus, conducting appropriate test, such as, cement bond log 
and negative pressure test, and carefully evaluate the test results are very important for 
preventing well control events due to cement failure. All these factors were considered 
while developing sets of leading indicators and constructing probabilistic models to assess 
cement failure probability. The Bayesian network model has been presented in Figure 23. 
As discussed earlier, the leading indicators were converted into probability distributions 
to construct the model. Observations can be entered in terms of low, medium or high based 
on accepted definitions to evaluate integrity of cementing as well control barrier. 
84 
 
Figure 23 Leading indicators model- Cementing failure
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5.2.2. Well Intervention – Wireline operations 
 
Wireline/slickline operations are conducted on producing wells and the barrier 
arrangements are quite different compared to drilling and completion activities. Wireline 
blowouts do not necessarily precede by kicks, failure of wireline equipment may initiate 
a well control event which can be escalated to a blowout by failure of tree valves and/or 
wireline BOP equipment. Release of hydrocarbon to atmosphere is the major real-time 
indicator for potential barrier failure issues, thus, focusing on leading indicators to 
evaluate and monitor barrier performance is very important in wireline operations.  
Unlike drilling and completion, for wireline operations all the potential barriers 
were incorporated together in a single model to assess probability of a major well control 
event. The Bayesian network model has been presented in Figure 24. Mechanical failure 
of pressure/well control equipment, procedural deviation and human factors in well 
control response are some of the major causes of well control events. Thus, organizational 
performance indicators related to maintenance, function testing, pressure testing, 
inspection and competency profile were proposed and used in the probabilistic model. On 
the other hand, operational complexities (e.g., tool stuck issues), need for frequent 
adjustments of packing or pump pressure and overall operational discipline can also 
indicate possibilities of well control issues. All these indicators can assess integrity of 










The leading indicators-based Bayesian network models that were constructed have 
multiple functions – 
 
1. With available leading indicators data, the probabilities of kick initiating events or 
barrier failures can be estimated  
2. Role of influencing organizational/operational factors for confirmed kick or barrier 
failure scenario can be estimated (diagnostic assessment), this could be helpful for 
identifying weaknesses and vulnerabilities in a system 
3. The efficiencies of different kick detection parameters can be assessed for a 
confirmed kick scenario and performance influencing factors for these parameters 
can also be identified and improved for effective kick detection 
 
For example, Figure 25 shows the distribution of leading indicators based on 
operational issues and organizational factors, and efficiencies of relevant process 
observables to indicate abnormalities during kicks caused by abnormal pore pressure (pore 
pressure>wellbore pressure). For the mock dataset, the level of efficiencies of different 
real-time indicators (e.g., mud flow differential, increase in pump pressure, mud gas 
content) were found to be ranged from 70-80% due to limitations in system design, 
planning and preparations. Which could mean that, there might be a 20-30% chance that 
low hydrostatic head due to abnormal pore pressure will not be detected in the early phase 
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of kick development. So, the factors that affect proactive measurement process can be 
identified with this diagnostic analysis. In this case, arrangements for mud flow and mud 
properties measurement are crucial for detecting influxes timely and efficiently. Again, 
job planning and competency were found to be the most critical organizational factors for 
preventing hydrostatic head failure. So, indicators related to these factors could play a big 
role in predicting potential failure.  
Similar assessment was conducted for well swabbing events which has been 
presented in Figure 26. During pulling out, adequate amount of mud needs to be pumped 
into the wellbore to fill back the volume previously occupied by the drilling assembly. If 
pulling out faster than mud pumping/filling rate, bottomhole pressure may drop below the 
formation pressure causing influx. Thus, trip tank volume serves as a very crucial indicator 
which can show whether adequate mud has been added to the system or not. Also, influx 
from reservoir may replace mud in the wellbore causing an increase in the trip tank 
volume. To accurately assess these events, it is important to use accurate flow and volume 
measurement techniques. Proper job planning is also very crucial not only for preventing 
swabbing events but also to make sure that the trip tank volume is not impacted by any 
other jobs apart from the pulling out operations. For confirmed kick scenario due to 




Figure 25 Leading indicators model – Loss of hydrostatic head due to abnormal pore pressure (confirmed scenario) 




Figure 26 Leading indicators model- Loss of hydrostatic head due to swabbing (confirmed scenario) 
Reprinted with permission from Elsevier Ltd. Copyright 2018.
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For assessing integrity of cement as a well control barrier, probability distributions 
for leading indicators were assigned to the Bayesian network model discussed in Section 
5.2.1. Appropriate observations can be made to the leading indicators nodes for 
determining possibilities of well control events due to cement failure. One possible 
scenario has been presented in Figure 27 to discuss predictive application of the model. In 
this hypothetical case, the cement bond log test was assumed to be inadequate (node state 
set as ‘low’) and the annular pressure observed to be high (node state set as ‘high’). These 
observations could potentially indicate improper cement placement in the annulus and the 
probability of cement failure was found to be about 35%. If performance states of some 
other leading indicators also fall into unacceptable region, for example, ‘low’ for use of 
adequate centralizer and ‘low’ experience in current position and result interpretation, the 
failure probability of cement would significantly increase (Figure 28). For this case the 
failure mechanism can be explained as follows –  
use of inadequate centralizer → low pipe stand-off ratio → presence of mud 
channels in annulus → improper cement placement → failure to achieve zonal isolation 
→ failure to detect due to inadequate cement evaluation (cement bond log) → removal 
of hydrostatic head → influx through annulus → annular pressure increases  
 Similarly, other potential failure mechanisms can be analyzed with the developed 
leading indicators-based models. 
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Figure 28 Leading indicators model- cementing failure (observation 2)
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Both diagnostic and predictive functions of the developed models were tested in 
this study. Diagnostic reasoning was performed for confirmed kick scenario while drilling 
and completion. This analysis proved that, the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of a well 
control system can be identified with integrated leading indicators-based probabilistic 
models. Major events can be avoided if these weaknesses are identified and fixed in time.  
  Predictive reasoning was performed for cementing operations. Two hypothetical 
cases were analyzed to observe responses of the developed model. For a same failure 
mechanism, four or more leading indicators in unacceptable range indicate higher 
probability of cementing failure when compared to a case with two leading indicators in 
unacceptable range. This was an expected outcome, which proves the applicability of these 
models in predicting abnormal conditions.  
Sensitivity analysis can also be performed for the developed models to assess the 
impacts of some selected indicators on target nodes (causal factor/barrier failure). A 
tornado graph representing the sensitivity of a target variable (abnormal pore pressure) to 
some selected variables (leading indicators) has been shown in Figure 29. For example, 
the indicator which has highest impact on the pore pressure to be in the ‘low’ state is 
‘number of times mud pressure falls within 5% of pore pressure’. This can change the 
probability of abnormal pore pressure to be low from 30.6%-83%. These impact results 
can change if the models are updated with probability observations from real data. 
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Figure 29 Tornado graph for sensitivity of abnormal pore pressure
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The primary objectives of this research study were to develop a robust framework 
for identifying leading indicators for oil and gas well drilling, completion and intervention 
operations, and to construct probabilistic models using leading indicators data for 
assessing well control barrier failure events.  Key results and findings of this study can be 
summarized as follows: 
1. A general framework for identifying and developing sets of leading indicators 
were proposed with clear definition and categorization of leading indicators. 
Leading indicators have been primarily categorized into two groups – real-time 
observables and indicators based on operational/organizational performances. 
A systematic cause-based methodology for identifying appropriate sets of 
leading indicators was also proposed which can be applied effectively to any 
well operations including drilling, completion and workover.  
2. Drilling, completion and well intervention operations were assessed 
thoroughly for developing suitable sets of indicators by following the proposed 
systematic approach. Primary well control barriers (hydrostatic head and 
cementing) were analyzed for drilling and completion activities, since the 
major focus of this study was on kick prediction and prevention. Well control 
barrier program is different in well wireline/slickline operations, and for that 
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reason these operations were analyzed separately. Fault tree analyses were 
performed to identify key causal factors for failure of the critical barriers while 
drilling, completion and wireline operations. Two different sets of leading 
indicators were proposed for monitoring integrity of two major primary well 
control barriers while drilling and completion – hydrostatic head and 
cementing. A set of leading indicators was also proposed for monitoring well 
control performance for preventing major events while conducting wireline 
operations.   
3. Two major blowout incidents, Montara and Deepwater Horizon, were studied 
thoroughly for assessing applicability of leading indicators and the proposed 
framework for predicting potential abnormal conditions. This study suggested 
that for both of the incidents, appropriate sets of leading indicators could have 
provided early information on different operational and organizational issues 
that contributed towards the blowout. The analyses validate the critical need 
for a robust leading indicators program for preventing major incidents and the 
applicability of the proposed framework for developing appropriate sets of 
indicators. 
4. Using the real-time indicators for detecting kicks while drilling, a couple of 
decision support algorithms were constructed. These algorithms provide 
crucial information on how different parameters change with progression of a 
kick and what actions need to be taken for confirming a kick scenario timely 
and efficiently.  
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5. For assessing barrier functions, probabilistic models were developed by 
integrating different groups of leading indicators. A Bayesian network tool was 
used to construct these models which can provide more realistic assessment of 
well control system. These models have multiple functions including – 
a. With leading indicators data, probabilities of kick initiating events or 
barrier failures can be assessed. Cementing failure event was analyzed 
by making different observations to certain leading indicators. This 
analysis showed the usefulness of these models in predicting barrier 
failure probabilities with information obtained from leading indicators. 
b. For a confirmed kick initiating or barrier failure event, influencing 
operational and organizational factors can be identified and corrected 
to reduce event probability. In this study, hydrostatic head failure event 
was analyzed for confirmed abnormal pore pressure and swabbing 
scenario.  
c. Efficiency of a kick detection system can also be assessed with the 
diagnostic analysis of these models. For example, both abnormal pore 
pressure and swabbing scenario were analyzed to observe how kick 
detection parameters behave for confirmed kick scenarios for the 
assumed sets of data. It was found that, the efficiencies of kick 
detection parameters are impacted by key organizational factors, e.g., 




6.2. Recommendations for Future Works 
 
Due to unavailability of appropriate leading indicators data, the base models were 
constructed with datasets assumed based on literature review, incident analysis and expert 
opinion. The next step of this study could be taking the proposed sets of leading indicators 
for drilling, completion or wireline operations, and collect data for a number of operations 
over a certain period of time. These data can be statistically treated to determine 
probability distributions for the leading indicators and the models can be updated with the 
new sets of data. This could provide more realistic estimation of kick initiating events or 
barrier failure probabilities.  
The proposed models can be implemented and be used for assessing drilling, 
completion or wireline operations and leading indicators data/observation can be recorded 
for confirmed kick or failure scenarios. This study would help to identify crucial 
organizational and operational factors for preventing kicks and blowouts and validate 
criticality of each of the proposed indicators. This analysis would also help to determine 
the appropriate weightage factors of the indicator nodes that need to be assigned in the 
Bayesian network models. Based on the findings, the proposed models can be updated for 
accurate assessment of well control systems. 
This study can also be extended for evaluating secondary barrier elements for 
drilling and completion operations, e.g., blowout preventer, and pressure control 
equipment used in managed pressure drilling (MPD). For each of the drilling phases, 
probabilistic models for primary and secondary sets of barriers can be integrated together 
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for assessing well control performance for total drilling operation. Similarly, other well 
operations, e.g., hydraulic workover, abandonment, can also be studied for developing 
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